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Background: Cases of emerging infectious diseases, including H5N1 influenza, H7N9 influenza, and Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome, have been reported in recent years, and the threat of pandemic outbreaks persists. In Japan,
primary care is the frontline against emerging infectious diseases in communities. Although the importance of
pandemic preparedness in primary care has been highlighted previously, few studies have thus far investigated the
preparedness among primary care practices (PCPs) or differences in the preparedness of different institutional
settings. We examined PCP preparedness and response to the 2009 influenza pandemic in Japan, and explored the
role of a pandemic preparedness plan during the pandemic.
Methods: We used a survey questionnaire to assess how well individual PCPs in Okinawa, Japan, were prepared for
the 2009 influenza pandemic. The questionnaire was mailed to all eligible PCPs (N = 465) in Okinawa, regardless of
their institutional setting. In addition, we assessed the differences in the preparedness of clinics and hospitals and
determined whether the national preparedness plan affected individual preparedness and response. Data were
analyzed using descriptive and logistic regression analyses.
Results: A total of 174 (37.4%) PCPs responded to our survey. In general, high-level personal protective equipment
(PPE) such as N95 masks (45.4%), gowns (30.5%), and eye protection (21.3%) was stocked at a low rate. Clinic-based
PCPs were significantly less prepared than hospital-based PCPs to provide N95 masks (OR 0.34), gowns (OR 0.15),
and eye protection (OR 0.18). In addition, only 32.8% of PCPs adopted an adequate business continuity plan (BCP).
After controlling for institutional setting, reading the national preparedness plan was significantly associated with
establishment of a BCP (OR 5.86), and with knowledge of how to transfer a swab specimen to a local medical
laboratory (OR 5.60).
Conclusions: With regard to PPE availability, PCPs (especially clinic-based PCPs) were not adequately prepared for the
influenza pandemic. Awareness of the national pandemic preparedness plan is likely to promote prefecture-wide
implementation of BCPs and surveillance activity.
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Medical and public health authorities often warn the
public about emerging respiratory infectious disease out-
breaks. Two recent examples are avian influenza [1,2]
and novel coronavirus infections such as Middle East
Respiratory Syndrome [3,4]. In the past decade, cases of
H5N1 and, more recently, H7N9 influenza infections,
have been reported in Southeast and East Asian coun-
tries [5]. The fatality rates associated with these diseases
are relatively high, but there appears to be limited
human-to-human transmission. Nevertheless, the threat
of a pandemic outbreak persists.
Primary care serves as the frontline against emerging
infectious diseases. Primary care practices (PCPs) have
an important role in treating and controlling the spread
of these diseases in communities [6]. For example, a
family physician in Canada examined, diagnosed, and
treated the index case of the 2003 outbreak of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) [7]. The index case
in the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic in Japan was also
examined by a family physician, in Kobe, Hyogo. The pa-
tient had no previous contact with infected foreigners,
nor did he have a history of travel to areas of epidemic
2009 H1N1 influenza [8].
Because PCPs are likely to examine patients who
present with acute respiratory illness, they are at risk of
contracting emerging infectious diseases [9]. Therefore,
it is possible for PCPs to have unexpected direct contact
with infected patients [10]. Direct contact between PCPs
and patients in health care settings is a major risk factor
for infection [11]. Poutanen et al. (2003) reported that
during the 2003 SARS outbreak, 60 of the 330 SARS pa-
tients were health care workers who had direct or indir-
ect contact with SARS-infected patients, and five of the
infected healthcare workers died from SARS [7]. Even if
there is a perceived high risk of infection, PCPs are will-
ing to treat victims of emerging infectious diseases such
as pandemic influenza [12] and SARS [7]. If effective in-
fection control measures are not established, primary
care providers who work in PCPs have a higher risk of
contracting the infection.
The importance of pandemic preparedness for reducing
the risk of infection and promoting an effective pandemic
outbreak response has been highlighted in recent years.
The World Health Organization (WHO) issued a “Pre-
paredness Plan” for pandemic influenza in 1999, which
was revised in 2005 [13]. The plan’s objectives and some
recommendations (e.g., the use of antiviral drugs) are spe-
cific for influenza outbreaks, while other parts of the plan
focus on preparedness and response to other emerging in-
fectious diseases.
Preparedness can be defined as the ability to reduce mor-
bidity and mortality that results from large-scale transmis-
sion of infectious diseases such as pandemic influenza, orfrom other natural or man-made disasters [14]. Prepared-
ness plans consist of public health capacity building, and
include activities relevant for individual healthcare facil-
ities. These activities include surveillance, communication,
vaccination services, and maintenance of an inventory of
antiviral drugs. All WHO member states were advised to
develop an individualized pandemic plan, because the con-
tents and structure of healthcare partnerships depend on
country-specific regulatory, finance, and administration
systems [13].
Pandemic preparedness planning in Japan is based on
a national preparedness plan issued by the Cabinet office
and the Ministry of Health, Labour and Welfare of Japan
in 2005. This plan included guidelines for pandemic in-
fluenza management, and was revised in 2009 [15] and
again in 2013. The 2013 revised plan includes informa-
tion on avian influenza and other novel emerging re-
spiratory diseases such as coronaviruses. The Japanese
health care system provides universal health care cover-
age, and patients can access any type of medical care in-
stitution, meaning that both clinics and hospitals contain
PCPs. During an influenza pandemic, as a part of sur-
veillance, every PCP is required to report a suspected
pandemic influenza case to a local public health center,
and take a specimen from suspected cases and transfer
it to a local laboratory for PCR testing.
Pandemic preparedness plans have mainly emphasized
hospital preparedness. Although there have been some
attempts to include primary care, implementation of pri-
mary care preparedness and response has not been ad-
equately addressed [16,17]. There have been few reports
on the preparedness of individual PCPs to respond to
emerging respiratory infectious diseases, and on the ef-
fect of planning on individual preparedness. Therefore,
our aims were to: (1) examine PCP preparedness for
pandemic influenza, and examine actual PCP response
during the 2009 pandemic influenza outbreak, and
(2) compare the preparedness of clinics versus hospitals
in Japan, and evaluate the effectiveness of the current in-
fluenza plan for the promotion of institutional prepared-
ness and response.
Methods
We used a postal survey to assess the preparedness and
response of primary care practices to the 2009 pandemic
H1N1 influenza (A(H1N1)pdm09) outbreak. Survey
questions were based on WHO checklists [18,19] and
Japan’s guidelines for the prevention and control of pan-
demic influenza. The questions addressed the essential
components of institutional preparedness and response
to pandemic influenza [20].
The survey consisted of seven preparedness and re-
sponse topics: the storage and supply of personal pro-
tective equipment (PPE), knowledge of the surveillance
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(BCP), the storage and supply of antiviral drugs, patient
management to transfer severe patients to a designated
hospital, the isolation of patients with influenza-like illness
from other patients (such as physical barriers in shared
waiting areas), and the provision of a vaccine service. The
institutional information included questions related to the
degree of recognition of the national preparedness plan
and the degree of acceptance of A(H1N1)pdm09 patients.
We included 12 questions that could be answered with
yes/no or with 3- or 5-point Likert scale responses. The
questionnaire was pilot-tested among a group of PCPs
who were not study participants, and was updated based
on the results of the pilot tests. Questionnaire details are
included in Additional file 1.
The survey was conducted in Okinawa Prefecture,
Japan, which has a population of approximately 1,400,000
people. We selected this prefecture as our study site be-
cause it is in close proximity to several East and Southeast
Asian countries and is visited by approximately 300,000
tourists every year. As such, Okinawa Prefecture has a
high risk of hosting infected patients from foreign coun-
tries and of experiencing a local epidemic of influenza or
other infectious respiratory disease. Okinawa Prefecture
experienced the first local epidemic of influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09 in 2009, and the epidemic period of the 2009
H1N1 pandemic in Okinawa was from June 2009 to
March 2010.
We identified 594 medical care institutions (clinics and
hospitals) in publicly available members’ lists of the five
local medical associations that cover Okinawa Prefecture.
Registration with a local medical association is not
compulsory for all Okinawan practices. However, only reg-
istered medical care institutions can provide government-
funded influenza vaccination and join a local network to
work with public health centers and local laboratories.
Therefore, primary care providers seeing patients with
influenza-like illness typically register with a local medical
association. We used the definition of clinics and hospitals
based on the definition in the Medical Care Act in Japan:
a clinic is a medical care institution with 19 or fewer beds,
while a hospital is a medical care institution with inpatient
facilities for 20 or more patients. We defined PCPs provid-
ing care for patients with influenza-like illness as medical
care institutions which contain the following departments:
internal medicine, pediatrics, ear, nose and throat, and/or
obstetrics/gynecology, because these are the departments
where patients with influenza-like illness in Japan typically
present. We made a list of all eligible PCPs from the 594
medical care institutions on the member lists, and mailed
a questionnaire to all eligible PCPs (n = 465) in Okinawa
Prefecture that may see patients with influenza-like illness
(based on the departments listed above). The question-
naire was mailed in July 2010, shortly after the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic. We requested that the clinic
and hospital directors, who are legally required to be med-
ical doctors in Japan, complete the questionnaire, because
these administrators are responsible for pandemic influ-
enza preparation and response. To increase the response
rate, a reminder to complete the questionnaire was mailed
2 weeks after the survey was mailed. To address non-
response bias, the response rate of PCPs in hospitals ver-
sus clinics was tested using chi-square analysis. Logistic
regression was used to compute univariate and multivari-
ate odds ratios (ORs) to evaluate the association between
the institutional setting (hospital versus clinic) and individ-
ual aspects of pandemic preparedness, as well as recog-
nition of the national preparedness plan. Questionnaire
responses were dichotomized into ‘stocked’ and ‘not
stocked’ for each PPE item, into ‘know’ and ‘not know’ for
surveillance, into ‘planned’ and ‘not planned’ for BCP, into
‘implemented’ and ‘not implemented’ for isolation of
symptomatic patients, into ‘provided’ and ‘not provided’
for pandemic vaccine, and into ‘stocked’ and ‘not stocked’
for antiviral drugs. Subjective evaluation of institutional
preparedness was dichotomized into ‘good or fair’ and ‘not
fair, bad, or not sure’. Multivariate analysis included
adjustment for clinical setting (clinic versus hospital) or
awareness of the national preparedness plan (yes versus
no). We estimated ORs with 95% confidence intervals
(95% CI), and values of P < 0.05 were considered statisti-
cally significant. Statistical analyses were performed with
Stata SE software (StataCorp, College Station, TX). The in-
stitutional review board of the Tokyo Medical and Dental
University approved the ethical and scientific validity of
the study (ID: 1522).
Results
Participant characteristics
Of the 594 medical care institutions on the local medical
associations’ lists, 465 institutions were eligible for enroll-
ment in our study, and medical directors of these institu-
tions were invited to complete the questionnaire. A total
of 37.4% (174/465) responded. Eighty-six percent (149/
174) of the respondents were based in clinics, and the
remaining 25 were based in hospitals (Table 1). All re-
spondents were medical doctors and 95.4% of respondents
were male. The average age was 58.3 years (range: 36–90),
and the average length of respondents’ experience as a
physician was 31.4 years (range: 10–66). No statistically
significant difference in response frequency was found be-
tween hospitals and clinics (Table 2), demonstrating that
the same proportion of practices responded from each
institutional setting.
Descriptive analysis
Almost all of the institutions (94.3%; n = 164) accepted
patients infected with influenza A(H1N1)pdm09. More
Table 1 Characteristics of survey respondents and their
institutions (N = 174)
Categories Number %
Respondents
Sex Male 166 95.4
Age (years) < 45 13 7.5
45 – 64 116 66.7
> 64 45 25.8
Length of medical experience (years) < 20 21 12.1
20 – 40 122 70.1
> 40 31 17.8
Had read the government guidelines Yes 134 77.0
Subjective evaluation of preparedness Good or fair 95 54.6
Institutions
Institutional setting Clinic 149 85.6
Hospital 25 14.4
Accepted patients with A(H1N1)pdm Yes 164 94.3
N: number, A(H1N1)pdm: 2009 pandemic influenza A(H1N1).
Table 3 Descriptive analysis, pandemic preparedness, and




PPE supplies and storage
Gown Stocked 53 (30.46)
Mask: surgical mask Stocked 147 (84.48)
N95 mask Stocked 79 (45.40)
Eye protection Stocked 37 (21.26)
Gloves Stocked 124 (71.26)
Hand sanitizer supplies Stocked 52 (87.36)
Pharmaceuticals
Storage of antiviral drugs Stocked 144 (82.76)
Surveillance








Business continuity plan Planned 57 (32.76)
Source control
Isolated ILI patients from other patients Isolated 124 (71.26)
Pharmaceutical prevention
Provided Vaccination service Provided 165 (94.83)
PPE: personal protective equipment, ILI: influenza-like illness.
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institution’s preparedness as good or fair, regardless of
their institutional setting.
Table 3 depicts the descriptive results of the seven
topics included in the questionnaire. Alcohol- and non-
alcohol-based hand sanitizers were well stocked (87.4%;
n = 152), but recommended personal protective equip-
ment such as N95 masks (45.4%; n = 79), gowns (30.5%;
n = 53), and eye protection (21.3%; n = 37) were not ad-
equately stocked (Table 3). Instead, PCPs stocked stand-
ard equipment such as surgical masks (84.5%; n = 147)
and gloves (71.3%; n = 124) to protect themselves from
infection. Anti-influenza drugs were well stocked (82.8%;
n = 144). Stockpiling of antiviral drugs was a part of the
medical intervention program against pandemic influ-
enza, and these drugs were used to treat infected pa-
tients and for post-exposure prophylaxis in those who
were in close contact with symptomatic individuals. In
terms of surveillance, a relatively high percentage of
PCPs knew the procedure for handling throat swab spec-
imens from suspected cases, and knew that specimens
should be transferred to a designated local laboratory
(79.3%; n = 138). The PCPs reported that almost all of
the institutions (97.7%; n = 170) have a local designated









Clinics 396 149 37.6
Hospitals 69 25 36.2
Non-response in institutional setting: Pearson’s chi-square = 0.05; p = 0.823.relatively low percentage of PCPs (32.8%; n = 57) estab-
lished a BCP for preparing for pandemic influenza.
Many PCPs (71.3%; n = 124) isolated patients with
influenza-like illness from other patients, either using dif-
ferent consultation rooms or a physical barrier, and almost
all institutions (94.8%; n = 165) provided pandemic vaccine
to their patients.
Comparative analysis by institutional setting
After adjusting for recognition of the national pandemic
preparedness plan, our multivariate regression analyses
revealed that clinics were less likely to stockpile recom-
mended high-level PPE such as N95 masks (OR 0.34; 95%
CI 0.14–0.84), gowns (OR 0.15; 95% CI 0.06–0.38), and
eye protection (OR 0.18; 95% CI 0.07–0.44) (Table 4).
Measures for separating suspected influenza patients and
the use of masks as source control against infection were
adopted by fewer clinics than hospitals, but not to a
significant extent.
Effect of the national preparedness plan
After controlling for institutional setting, the results of a
multivariate logistic regression analysis revealed that
Table 4 Comparison of clinic versus hospital pandemic influenza preparedness and response, Okinawa, Japan (N = 174)
Institutional setting
Clinic Hospital
n (%) n (%) Univariate Multivariate
Response (N = 149) (N = 25) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)* p value
Healthcare staff protection
PPE supplies and storage
Gown Stocked 36 (24.16) 17 (68.00) 0.15 (0.06–0.38) 0.15 (0.06–0.38) <0.00
Mask: surgical mask Stocked 124 (83.22) 23 (92.00) 0.43 (0.10–1.94) 0.44 (0.10–1.98) 0.28
N95 mask Stocked 62 (41.61) 17 (68.00) 0.33 (0.14–0.83) 0.34 (0.14–0.84) 0.02
Eye protection Stocked 24 (16.11) 13 (52.00) 0.18 (0.07–0.44) 0.18 (0.07–0.44) <0.00
Gloves Stocked 103 (69.13) 21 (84.00) 0.43 (0.14–1.31) 0.43 (0.14–1.33) 0.14
Hand sanitizer supplies Stocked 130 (87.25) 22 (88.00) 0.93 (0.26–3.42) 0.95 (0.26–3.50) 0.94
Pharmaceutical arrangement
Storage of antiviral drugs Stocked 120 (80.54) 24 (96.00) 0.17 (0.02–1.33) 0.17 (0.02–1.33) 0.10
Surveillance
Know how to transfer
A specimen to laboratory Knew 121 (81.21) 17 (68.00) 2.03 (0.80–5.18) 2.42 (0.88–6.61) 0.09
Institutional management
Business continuity plan Planned 47 (31.54) 10 (40.00) 0.69 (0.29–1.65) 0.71 (0.29–1.75) 0.45
Source control
Isolated ILI patients from
Other patients Isolated 103 (69.13) 21 (84.00) 0.43 (0.14–1.31) 0.43 (0.14–1.32) 0.14
Pharmaceutical prevention
Provided vaccination service Provided 141 (94.63) 24 (96.00) 0.73 (0.09–6.14) 0.70 (0.08–5.90) 0.74
N, n: number, CI: confidence interval, PPE: personal protective equipment, ILI: influenza-like illness.
*The multivariate odds ratio models included degree of familiarity with the national preparedness plan.
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associated with the establishment of a BCP (OR 5.86; 95%
CI 1.97–17.45) and with knowledge about the procedure
for the transfer of swab specimens to a local medical la-
boratory (OR 5.6; 95% CI 2.48–12.63) (Table 5). Stock-
piling PPE, hand sanitizer, or antiviral drugs was not
significantly associated with review of the national pan-
demic preparedness plan.
Discussion
Our results indicate that primary care practices in
Okinawa Prefecture, Japan lacked essential components
for pandemic influenza preparedness. Of the seven
topics of pandemic preparedness and response, we
found that PCPs were particularly not well prepared
with respect to PPE and BCP.
PPE is recommended as the main method for protecting
primary healthcare workers and patients from pandemic
influenza and other infectious diseases [18,19]. However,
primary care clinics were less likely than hospitals to keep
adequate supplies of PPE. There was significantly less rec-
ommended high-level PPE such as N95 masks, gowns, and
eye protection at clinics than at hospitals. A systematicreview that investigated the efficacy of PPE for protection
against respiratory viruses suggested that PPE is highly ef-
fective at preventing the spread of SARS. Odds ratios for
various PPE (with a lower OR meaning more protective)
are: masks (OR 0.32); N95 masks (OR 0.09); gloves (OR
0.43); gowns (OR 0.23); and hand washing, masks, gloves
and gowns combined (OR 0.09) [21]. Shaw et al. [12] re-
ported that the successful containment of SARS outbreaks
depends on the appropriate use of infection control mea-
sures such as PPE [22]. In the case of influenza A(H1N1)
pdm09, appropriate use of PPE, such as gloves, seemed to
reduce the risk of A(H1N1)pdm09 transmission [23]. In-
sufficient infection control preparedness increases the
probability that PCPs, especially clinic-based PCPs, will be
exposed to (and contract) respiratory infectious diseases.
This vulnerability can reduce the capacity of community
clinics to respond to a large number of patients that re-
quire treatment during a pandemic, and puts the health of
all patients attending local health care services at risk.
There are diverse reasons for the lack of PPE pre-
paredness at primary care institutions. Clinic-based
PCPs realize that PPE should be worn to protect them-
selves, other healthcare staff members, and patients
Table 5 Effect of familiarity with the national pandemic influenza preparedness plan, Okinawa, Japan (N = 174)
National preparedness plan
Read Not read
n (%) n (%) Univariate Multivariate
Response (N = 134) (N = 40) OR (95% CI) OR (95% CI)* p value
Healthcare staff protection
PPE supplies and storage
Gown Stocked 45 (33.58) 8 (20.00) 2.02 (0.86–4.75) 2.08 (0.84–5.14) 0.11
Mask: surgical mask Stocked 115 (85.82) 32 (80.00) 1.51 (0.61–3.78) 1.49 (0.60–3.74) 0.39
N95 mask Stocked 65 (48.51) 14 (35.00) 1.75 (0.84–3.64) 1.74 (0.82–3.66) 0.15
Eye protection Stocked 32 (23.88) 5 (12.50) 2.20 (0.79–6.08) 2.23 (0.77–6.44) 0.14
Gloves Stocked 99 (73.88) 25 (62.50) 1.70 (0.80–3.58) 1.68 (0.79–3.56) 0.18
Hand sanitizer supplies Stocked 119 (88.81) 33 (82.50) 1.68 (0.63–4.47) 1.68 (0.63–4.47) 0.30
Pharmaceutical arrangement
Stockpile of antiviral drugs Stocked 111 (82.84) 33 (82.50) 1.02 (0.40–2.60) 0.10 (0.40–2.55) 0.99
Surveillance
Know how to transfer
A specimen to laboratory Knew 116 (86.57) 22 (55.00) 5.27 (2.38–11.70) 5.60 (2.48–12.63) <0.00
Institutional management
Business continuity plan Planned 53 (39.55) 4 (10.00) 5.89 (1.98–17.51) 5.86 (1.97–17.45) <0.00
Source control
Isolated ILI patients from
Other patients Isolated 97 (72.39) 27 (67.50) 1.26 (0.59–2.71) 1.24 (0.58–2.68) 0.58
Pharmaceutical prevention
Provided vaccination service Provided 125 (93.28) 40 (100.00) NA NA NA
N, n: number, CI: confidence interval, PPE: personal protective equipment, ILI: influenza-like illness, NA: not available.
*The multivariate odds ratio models included institutional setting.
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purchase a large amount of PPE, and a lack of storage
space, may lead to reluctance to maintain large supplies
[12]. In Japan, primary care clinics are generally man-
aged as small private practices, with limited space and
small budgets. These clinics are likely to curtail the ele-
ments of preparedness that require finances and space.
Most primary care providers in PCPs believe that gov-
ernments are responsible for stockpiling and providing
PPE during pandemics [12,24]. Without explicit guide-
lines that designate who is responsible for providing PPE
during pandemics, supplies of PPE are likely to be inad-
equate. This PPE supply shortage may lead to PCPs
declining to see patients with influenza-like illness, to
protect themselves and their staff, which makes the per-
sonal lives and families of medical staff the priority in-
stead of the provision of care to the community. This
premise is supported by the observation that 37.5% of
the general practices in Canada closed their doors dur-
ing the SARS outbreak [25]. Practical incentives (e.g., fi-
nancial support) and/or strategies for the distribution of
stockpiled supplies of PPE should be developed by thenational health authority so that individual PCPs can re-
spond effectively during pandemics.
We found that sufficient supplies of N95 masks were
not maintained by PCPs, but that adequate supplies of
surgical masks were available. It is not known whether a
surgical mask is as effective as an N95 mask in providing
protection against influenza and other respiratory vi-
ruses. If surgical masks are sufficient, then inventories of
N95 masks are not necessary. The size and nature of in-
fectious influenza particles that are transmitted during
coughing or sneezing are not well understood, and the
efficacy of a surgical mask to prevent disease transmis-
sion is not known [26]. Theoretically, an N95 mask
should be used for particles < 5 μm transmitted via aero-
sol, and the efficacy of an N95 mask for the prevention
of transmission of influenza has been shown [27]. How-
ever, studies conducted in healthcare settings have not
yet reached a definite conclusion regarding the use of
different types of masks. During the 2009 pandemic in-
fluenza, an N95 mask was significantly associated with a
lower risk of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus infection,
compared with a surgical mask [28]. In contrast, results
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not seem to be inferior to a N95 mask for the protection
of health care workers against seasonal influenza viruses
[28]. The Japanese preparedness plan and guidelines do
not recommend a specific type of mask, and published
recommendations regarding the use of specific types of
masks are not consistent [29]. The cost of N95 masks is
also relevant. Phin et al. (2009) showed that N95 masks
can have significant financial and logistic implications be-
cause they cost 30 times more than surgical masks and
should be replaced every 3 years [30]. Considering the
current lack of evidence for the superiority of N95 masks,
the cost of purchasing large quantities for stockpiling, and
the general lack of storage space, it seems unrealistic to
prepare for pandemics with N95 masks. Overall, PPE is
the most appropriate choice for limiting disease transmis-
sion, but further studies of which particular PPE is most
effective are clearly necessary.
Our findings revealed that a BCP was not implemented
by most clinic- or hospital-based PCPs. Institutions that
reviewed the national pandemic preparedness plan and
guidelines were more likely to have a BCP. A BCP is a
contingency plan for responding to the surge in patient
numbers during a pandemic. A BCP provides guidance on
how to maintain essential functions and supplies when
there are limited human resources. A BCP also identifies
essential practice functions, staffing contingencies, flexible
working hours and family care plans for staff members,
criteria for clinic closure, ancillary staff recruiting and
training, record keeping to ensure accountability for ac-
tions and inactions, and the use of antiviral medications.
A BCP also includes plans for simulation exercises that
complement training and that evaluate and refine local
practice plans and leadership delegation [16]. Hospital
BCP and clinic BCP are different, because the content of
BCPs should depend on the institutional setting, size of
practice, and role in the community. For instance, the US
Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) [31],
the American Academy of Family Physicians [32], and the
Canadian Medical Association [33] issued checklists of
BCP for clinics, which are relatively concise; conversely,
the CDC’s checklist of BCP for hospitals is longer and
more complicated [34].
It can be a major challenge to continue the essential
functions of a medical practice during a pandemic. At the
peak of a pandemic, approximately 30% of health care
workers can be sick and absent from work [35]. In
addition to the typical number of outpatients, during a
pandemic a PCP may be asked to treat 50 new cases with
influenza-like symptoms per week [36]. From a public
health perspective, the lack of BCPs could result in disrup-
tions in the local healthcare system, because PCPs care for
approximately 90% of the common healthcare needs in a
community [37,38]. Some PCPs close their clinics orhospitals during pandemics because they are not well pre-
pared for pandemic outbreaks and they prioritize their
personal life and family needs [35]. It is urgent that local
health authorities should coordinate with PCPs to develop
and improve clinic and hospital BCPs.
Familiarity with the national preparedness plan was
positively associated with BCP establishment and with sur-
veillance activities. BCP implementation and pandemic
surveillance activities fall within the context of public
health preparedness and response [16]. It is not always
easy for clinicians who work on the frontline to gain prac-
tical business skills, knowledge, or an interest in the ad-
ministrative functions of a medical practice. Our results
suggest that improved familiarity with the national guide-
lines could promote public health preparedness among
PCPs and lead to a systematic response to local pan-
demics. A previous study showed that limited awareness
of the national preparedness plan is one of the major bar-
riers to pandemic preparedness [39], and our results are
consistent with this finding. One reason for the low ac-
ceptance rate of the national plan is the lack of formal
PCP representation during the planning process [40]. It is
critical that all primary care workers, including PCPs,
community nurses, and caregivers, are engaged during
preparedness plan preparation. We propose that this
change could improve pandemic preparedness in the pri-
mary care sector, and PCP awareness of the plan. Further-
more, we suggest that the way in which PCPs are
informed about the content and importance of the plan
should be considered, to improve the number of PCPs
that are aware of the national plan.
Dr. Michael Osterholm, a public health scientist and
biosecurity expert, stated that “The difficulty in confront-
ing the possibility of an H5N1 pandemic is figuring out
what is necessary”. [41]. We cannot predict in advance the
emergence of novel infectious diseases in a community;
thus, our attention should be focused on preparation. Ap-
propriate preparation, sufficient information, appropriate
responses, administration of the correct treatment and ob-
servation when needed, and referral of patients to de-
signated secondary hospitals can be done under the
coordinated guidance of local health authorities. This type
of structure is also likely to reduce the risk that an infec-
tious disease outbreak will become a pandemic.
Limitations
The findings of this prefecture-wide study might not
represent the status of nationwide preparedness for pan-
demic influenza in the entire primary healthcare sector
of Japan. Nevertheless, Okinawa Prefecture is known to
have the highest risk in the country for local epidemics
associated with emerging respiratory infectious diseases.
Therefore, there is likely to be a relatively high aware-
ness of the risks of a pandemic among PCPs in Okinawa.
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are a good estimate for the level of preparedness among
PCPs in Japan.
The response rate to our survey questionnaire was
relatively low (37.4%, N = 174); therefore, the results
might be biased. However, our findings were similar to
the findings reported by a study in the United Kingdom
on the same topic [39].
Governance of the primary care sector in Japan is
characterized by a loose structure that exists between
clinics and hospitals. Patients with common health prob-
lems can access any PCP. Given this structure, it is not a
simple matter to implement coordinated actions be-
tween PCPs and health authorities, or to optimally use
PCP services [16]. This complexity may contribute to
PCPs’ poor pandemic preparedness. Research is clearly
needed to identify effective governance structures that
facilitate individual PCP preparedness and collaborative
action within the primary care sector.
We referenced scientific evidence from a variety of
airborne-transmitted diseases because relatively few
studies of pandemic influenza are available. In addition,
there has not been universal agreement on the theoret-
ical background of preparedness planning, and scientific
evidence about which structures are most effective for
implementing preparedness is still accumulating [42,43].
Nevertheless, there is agreement that preparedness in
the event of a pandemic is important.
Conclusions
The threat of pandemic influenza is persistent, and
PCPs, which will be at the front line of any responses to
pandemic influenza, need to properly prepare for pan-
demic influenza. This research provides information
about pandemic preparedness and response of PCPs in
Okinawa Prefecture, Japan. We assessed whether the in-
stitutional setting is associated with preparedness. PCPs,
especially clinic-based PCPs, were inadequately prepared
with regard to PPE. Results from this study suggest that
pandemic preparedness plan awareness is likely to pro-
mote the implementation of BCPs by PCPs. Increased
efforts to improve PCP familiarity with the plan, and im-
prove PPE preparedness, are needed.
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